- The offer. Putin has proposed a US-China-Russia trilateral summit in China to settle the Ukraine war, with Ukraine and European allies excluded. Reports say the Trump administration is receptive.
- The risk. Analysts argue the summit would primarily benefit Beijing and Moscow, not Washington, while providing a pretext for European capitals to disengage from the Western alliance.
- The precedent problem. The Nixon-era Kissinger logic — splitting rivals by engaging one — worked against a declining USSR. Critics say it fails against a rising China partnered with a revisionist Russia.
The proposal, first reported in late October, has revived a broader debate in Washington about whether the United States can peel Russia away from China — and at what cost. Dr. Andrew A. Michta, Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Florida’s Hamilton School and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, wrote in 19FortyFive that the gambit “risks America losing Europe to its adversaries.”
The Case For the Trilateral
Proponents of the summit argue that the post-Cold War unipolar moment is over and that a spheres-of-influence arrangement — comparable to the 19th-century Concert of Europe — is the realistic alternative to prolonged conflict. They contend that accommodating Russia’s role in Eastern Europe could free US strategic attention for a pivot to Asia, reduce energy costs, and create economic openings with Moscow. The Nixon 1971 opening to China is cited as the model: engage one rival to gain leverage on the other.
Putin has already received a partial dividend: in October, President Trump lifted sanctions on Russian diesel exports through next April following a call with Putin. The waiver drew sharp criticism from European allies, who saw it as rewarding Moscow while Kyiv remained under artillery fire.
The Strategic Counter-Argument
Michta’s core objection is structural: the Concert of Europe emerged after roughly 25 years of war in which every major power had an interest in stabilisation. No comparable condition exists today. China is rising in the Indo-Pacific as a challenger — not a status-quo power — while Russia pursues what Michta calls “neoimperial revisionist goals” in Europe.
A summit that produced a settlement on Russian terms would, in this analysis, invalidate the fundamental premise of NATO — that an attack on one is an attack on all. Some Nordic and Baltic allies, who have maintained the strongest discipline on Ukraine support, could find themselves isolated within an alliance whose largest member had negotiated a separate peace. Putin’s initial proposal to hold a trilateral at APEC tested this exact fault line.
Europe’s Ambiguous Position
Several European governments have been slower than the Nordic and Baltic states to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine and have continued purchasing Russian energy despite formal sanctions. The Trump administration’s tariff disputes and reported plans regarding Greenland have already strained transatlantic relations. Michta argues that a visible American accommodation of Moscow could function as a “license” for those governments to reconnect openly with Russia on trade — eroding the coalition that has sustained Ukraine’s resistance for more than four years.
Washington has not confirmed whether the trilateral format has been accepted. Ukraine and Europe have not been invited to endorse or reject any proposed terms. Russian officials said this month that Moscow would continue fighting until it achieved, in the words of Putin’s aide, “all its objectives.”