- Lead. The US Treasury’s OFAC designated six entities across Iran, China, Russia, and India on August 2 for supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, targeting its airline logistics and intelligence-gathering networks.
- Fact. Mahan Air, an Iranian carrier, is identified as “the IRGC’s airline of choice for moving weapons, military personnel, and equipment,” with Chinese firms coordinating the operations.
- Stake. The action extends US Iran sanctions deeper into Chinese and Indian commercial networks, raising the operational cost of maintaining Mahan Air as a functional asset for IRGC deployments.
The Designations
The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control announced the designations on August 2, acting under Executive Order 13224, which President George W. Bush signed in the days after the September 11, 2001, attacks and which authorises blocking the property of entities linked to terrorism. According to a report by JURIST, the six designated entities span four countries:
Mahan Air (Iran): OFAC describes it as “the IRGC’s airline of choice for moving weapons, military personnel, and equipment,” explicitly including drones. The airline has been designated in previous sanctions rounds.
DadeNegar Startup Studio (Iran): Described as an IRGC front company that operated a publicly accessible crowdsourced website soliciting the locations of American and Israeli military equipment for the IRGC to target.
Tang Xin and Shanghai Wings Logistics Company (China): Tang Xin, the managing director of Shanghai Wings and 50% owner of Shanghai Elite International Travel Company, is accused of coordinating travel for Mahan Air, including troop and weapons movements. Shanghai Wings is designated for providing material support to Mahan Air.
Shanghai Elite International Travel Company (China): Sanctioned for being owned and controlled by Tang Xin.
Skiez Travels and Logistics Private Limited (India) and Air Cargo Pro Limited (Russia): Both are designated as general sales agents for Mahan Air in their respective countries, facilitating ticket sales and commercial operations.
How It Fits the Broader Campaign
The August 2 round follows a July 29 action in which OFAC sanctioned 10 additional entities and 8 tankers for Iranian oil shipping, including six Chinese companies. Together, the rounds form part of a sustained US effort to squeeze Iran’s external revenue and military logistics. China’s role in sustaining Mahan Air’s commercial operations is a recurrent theme in these actions.
The new designations reveal a layer of commercial infrastructure — travel agencies and logistics coordinators — layered beneath the direct military supply lines that earlier rounds targeted. Earlier reporting on this site examined Chinese military equipment deliveries to Iran; the August 2 action shows that civilian commercial networks serve parallel functions in keeping IRGC logistics operational.
Practical Effect
OFAC sanctions freeze designated entities’ US-jurisdiction assets and prohibit US persons, including dollar-clearing banks, from transacting with them without a licence. For companies based in China, India, and Russia, direct legal exposure is limited because none of those governments enforce US secondary sanctions. However, the designations can deter international financial institutions from processing transactions on behalf of the named entities and add reputational risk to business relationships.
DadeNegar’s crowdsourced targeting platform is a notable entry in the designation. By using a public-facing website to gather intelligence on military equipment positions, the company attempted to blend civilian open-source tools with IRGC targeting requirements. Its designation signals that US authorities treat tech companies performing intelligence functions for the IRGC the same as direct arms suppliers under Executive Order 13224.